Trump's push for a new Iran agreement is running into a fundamental obstacle that no diplomatic framework has yet resolved — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its overseas Quds Force remain fully operational, and the regime's "4H" proxy axis of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraq's Hashd al-Shaabi militias remains intact. The strategic risk is not whether a deal is signed but whether it grants Tehran the time to rebuild influence it never fully surrendered. History — specifically the record of the previous Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — offers a cautionary baseline.
The Infrastructure Survived the Pressure
The elimination of Qassem Soleimani, the architect of Iran's regional terror network, was a landmark moment. If the deaths of Imad Mughniyeh and Osama bin Laden were significant milestones in the fight against Islamist terrorism, Soleimani's removal was arguably more consequential. Yet the structure he built survived him. Ahmad Vahidi, now among the most influential figures in the post-Khamenei order, remained embedded in the system. The network did not collapse; it adapted. That distinction matters enormously when evaluating what a new agreement can realistically achieve.
Israel's Mossad, under successive directors Yossi Cohen and David Barnea, succeeded in significantly damaging the Islamic Republic's transnational terror network across what Tehran describes as the Shiite Crescent. Tehran also crossed a historic threshold by launching direct missile and drone attacks against Israel — a step critics say exposed the true scope of the regime's ambitions rather than limiting them. Even so, the "4H" axis endured, and Tehran retains the capacity to activate those groups as pressure levers.
What Financial Relief Could Repeat
Critics of the current framework draw a direct line to the JCPOA experience. Many Iranians argued that the previous agreement delivered financial relief that strengthened the regime's terrorist infrastructure rather than benefiting ordinary citizens. The fear now is that any new deal producing economic concessions will produce the same second-order effect: resources flowing to the security establishment and the Quds Force rather than to civil society or political reform.
Within the ideological framework established by Ayatollah Khomeini, hostility toward the United States and Israel is a structural feature, not a negotiating position. The regime may modulate its tactics to secure a deal and buy time, but critics argue it does not revise its long-term objectives. That gap — between tactical flexibility and strategic continuity — is where previous diplomatic openings have stalled.
The Internal Variable Washington Is Discounting
Iran's domestic political pressure has not dissipated. The forces that fueled the uprising remain active beneath the surface, and many Iranians who once viewed Trump as a genuine champion of their cause now believe a new agreement has shifted American attention away from the internal struggle between the regime and a society demanding change. That perception carries its own strategic cost: it signals to regime hardliners that survival through negotiation is viable, while signaling to the opposition that Washington's support has limits.
The central question for markets and policymakers is not whether a framework can be agreed on paper. It is whether any agreement can prevent Tehran from reconstructing the transnational apparatus that threatens U.S. allies and regional stability. On current evidence, that case has not been made.